All You Can GET Intrusion Detection System
Local-development intrusion detection / log analysis for two log sources:
| Script | Source | Detection rule |
|---|---|---|
app.py |
unified entry point | runs both analyzers + optional firewall sync |
app/scan.py |
consolidated scanner | runs both analyzers, merges blocklists, syncs firewall |
app/copyparty.py |
copyparty server logs | denied-only IPs + copyparty auto-bans |
app/npm.py |
Nginx Proxy Manager proxy logs | high error-rate IPs (scanners) |
app/utils.py |
re-export layer | thin barrel — imports from sub-modules below |
app/models.py |
data model | Request, IPStats, aggregate() |
app/ip_utils.py |
IP helpers | parse_ip, whitelist_of, is_whitelisted, sort_ips, split_versions |
app/flags.py |
detection rules | flag_scanners, flag_denied_only, flag_malicious_patterns, by_total |
app/analyzer.py |
pipeline | Analyzer — discover → load → analyze → report → write |
app/whitelists.py |
whitelist module | provider CIDR constants, local/remote load, CIDR extraction |
app/bad_patterns.py |
pattern detection | malicious URL/file regex classification |
app/whois.py |
WHOIS query | query_whois_subnet, consolidate_by_subnet |
app/mikrotik.py |
RouterOS export | mikrotik_script, write_mikrotik, split_cidr_versions |
app/firewall.py |
RouterOS SSH client | MikrotikFirewall — connect, sync blocklist, audit state |
app/files.py |
I/O helpers | read_lines, find_logs, write_csv, write_json, etc. |
app/reporting.py |
text rendering | Column, render_table, render_kv, timestamp_name |
Both per-source scripts parse logs, aggregate per-IP behaviour, split IPv4/IPv6, skip whitelisted provider ranges, detect malicious path patterns, group flagged IPs into WHOIS subnets, and emit a ready-to-import MikroTik RouterOS firewall script.
app.py runs both analyzers, merges their blocklists, and optionally
synchronizes the MikroTik RouterOS firewall via SSH.
Status: local dev. Runs offline against log files on disk. Use
--update-firewallto push changes to the router, or--dry-runto preview without applying.
Architecture
intrusion-detection/
├── app.py unified entry point
├── app/ application package
│ ├── __init__.py
│ ├── scan.py consolidated scanner
│ ├── copyparty.py copyparty log adapter (~150 lines)
│ ├── npm.py NPM proxy log adapter (~150 lines)
│ ├── firewall.py MikroTik RouterOS SSH client
│ ├── utils.py thin re-export barrel (~90 lines)
│ ├── models.py Request, IPStats, aggregate()
│ ├── ip_utils.py IP parsing, whitelist lookups, sorting
│ ├── flags.py flag_scanners, flag_denied_only, flag_malicious_patterns
│ ├── analyzer.py Analyzer pipeline base class
│ ├── whitelists.py provider CIDR constants, local/remote load
│ ├── bad_patterns.py malicious URL/file regex patterns
│ ├── whois.py query_whois_subnet, consolidate_by_subnet
│ ├── mikrotik.py RouterOS .rsc script generation
│ ├── files.py read_lines, find_logs, write_csv/json/lines
│ └── reporting.py Column, render_table, render_kv, timestamp_name
├── data/ whitelist source files (cached locally)
│ ├── openfactory/
│ │ └── geofeed.csv
│ ├── cloudflare/
│ │ ├── ips-v4.txt
│ │ └── ips-v6.txt
│ └── paloalto/
│ └── scanner-ips.txt
├── reports/ generated reports (per-run + per-source)
│ ├── copyparty/
│ ├── npm/
│ └── mikrotik/ firewall audit snapshots
└── README.md
app/copyparty.py and app/npm.py are thin adapters. Each supplies a log
matcher, a line parser, a flagging rule, and column definitions.
Core responsibilities by module:
| Module | Owns |
|---|---|
app/models.py |
Request, IPStats, aggregate() |
app/ip_utils.py |
parse_ip, whitelist_of, is_whitelisted, sort_ips, split_versions |
app/flags.py |
flag_scanners, flag_denied_only, flag_malicious_patterns, by_total |
app/analyzer.py |
Analyzer — discover → load → analyze → report → write |
app/whitelists.py |
provider CIDR constants, local-file / remote / built-in loading |
app/bad_patterns.py |
malicious URL/file regex classification |
app/whois.py |
query_whois_subnet, consolidate_by_subnet |
app/mikrotik.py |
mikrotik_script, write_mikrotik, split_cidr_versions |
app/firewall.py |
MikrotikFirewall — SSH connect, sync blocklist, audit state |
app/files.py |
read_lines, find_logs, validate_dir, ensure_dirs, write_csv/json/lines |
app/reporting.py |
Column, render_table, render_kv, timestamp_name |
Console output and saved reports are the same string (Analyzer.text_report()).
Requirements
- Python 3.10+
- stdlib only, no dependencies
Usage
# unified entry point (both sources, optional firewall sync)
python app.py
python app.py --quiet
python app.py --update-firewall --dry-run
python app.py --update-firewall
# individual scanners (still runnable directly)
python -m app.copyparty
python -m app.npm
All scripts accept CLI overrides:
| Flag | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
--log-path |
see below | log directory |
--report-dir |
reports/<name> |
output directory |
--top N |
30 |
rows in the top-IP table |
--quiet |
off | write files, print only paths |
--min-errors N |
5 (npm.py) |
error count threshold |
--error-ratio F |
0.5 (npm.py) |
error ratio threshold |
--min-denied N |
1 (copyparty.py) |
denied-hit threshold |
--update-firewall |
off | sync blocklist to MikroTik via SSH |
--dry-run |
off | preview firewall changes, no apply |
app.py accepts all flags from both scanners plus --copyparty-log-path,
--copyparty-report-dir, --npm-log-path, --npm-report-dir, and
--report-dir for the consolidated output.
Default log paths (overridable by .env):
| Script | Env var | Default |
|---|---|---|
app/copyparty.py |
COPYPARTY_LOG_PATH |
P:\copyparty |
app/npm.py |
NPM_LOG_PATH |
Y:\npm\logs |
app/firewall.py |
ROUTER_IP |
192.168.88.1 |
ROUTER_USER |
admin |
|
ROUTER_PASSWORD |
(set in .env) |
Examples:
python -m app.npm --log-path D:\logs\npm --min-errors 10 --error-ratio 0.8
python -m app.copyparty --top 100
python app.py --quiet --update-firewall --dry-run
Output
Each script writes to its own report directory. app.py also writes
firewall audit snapshots:
reports/
├── copyparty/
│ ├── data/
│ │ ├── ips_ipv4.csv per-IP: total, denied, banned, users
│ │ ├── ips_ipv6.csv
│ │ ├── ips.json full per-IP detail w/ malicious hits
│ │ ├── denied_paths.csv denied paths, hit counts
│ │ ├── denied_ips.txt flagged IPv4 + metadata
│ │ ├── denied_ipv6.txt
│ │ ├── banned_ips.txt copyparty auto-banned IPv4
│ │ ├── banned_ipv6.txt
│ │ ├── blocked_ipv4.txt final block set (non-whitelisted)
│ │ ├── blocked_ipv6.txt
│ │ ├── authed_users.json authenticated user counts
│ │ └── requests.csv every parsed request
│ └── 2026-08-02-12-00-00.txt timestamped report
├── npm/
│ ├── data/
│ │ ├── ips_ipv4.csv per-IP: total, 4xx, 5xx, ratio, methods
│ │ ├── ips_ipv6.csv
│ │ ├── ips.json
│ │ ├── error_paths.csv
│ │ ├── scanner_ips.txt flagged IPv4 + metadata
│ │ ├── scanner_ipv6.txt
│ │ ├── blocked_ipv4.txt
│ │ ├── blocked_ipv6.txt
│ │ ├── ua_summary.csv user agent breakdown
│ │ ├── host_summary.csv virtual host breakdown
│ │ └── requests.csv
│ └── 2026-08-02-12-00-00.txt
└── mikrotik/
├── data/
│ ├── address_list_ipv4.json
│ ├── address_list_ipv6.json
│ ├── firewall_ipv4.json
│ └── firewall_ipv6.json
└── 2026-08-04-18-30-28.json firewall audit snapshot
Detection
Three detection layers
Blocklist candidates come from three independent sources, merged at scan time:
-
Error-rate flagging (
npm.py) — IPs with many 4xx/5xx responses and a high error ratio:\text{errors} \geq 5 \qquad \text{and} \qquad \frac{\text{errors}}{\text{total}} \geq 0.5 -
Denied-only flagging (
copyparty.py) — IPs that hit denied paths and never authenticated:\text{block} = \text{denied-only} \cup \text{banned} \setminus \text{whitelist} -
Malicious-pattern flagging (both analyzers) — IPs whose request paths match known probe/attack signatures (
.env,.git/config, WordPress probes, webshell filenames, etc.) at severity ≥ 2.
Pattern categories (bad_patterns.py)
| Pattern | Severity | Matches |
|---|---|---|
env_file |
3 (critical) | .env, .env.production, .aws/credentials, config.json |
vcs_probe |
3 (critical) | .git/config, .svn/ |
sensitive_file |
3 (critical) | id_rsa, id_dsa, .pem, .key, .ppk |
webshell_probe |
3 (critical) | Known webshell filenames (xstelth, adminfuns, wp_filemanager, etc.) |
wp_probe |
2 (high) | wp-admin, wp-login, wp-content, wp-includes |
generic_php_probe |
1 (moderate) | Single/double-char/numeric .php files |
well_known_probe |
1 (moderate) | .well-known/ paths |
Flagging metadata fields:
errors/denied— hostile hit counttotal— all requests from that IPratio— error ratio (npm only)first/last— first and last timestamp seenmalicious_hits— count of malicious-pattern request paths
Whitelisted ranges
Whitelists live in whitelists.py and data/. Loading priority per provider:
- Local files in
data/<provider>/(offline-safe, committed to repo) - Remote download (fetches latest, saves to local file on success)
- Built-in fallback (hardcoded constants, always available)
Each layer overrides the previous. Known-good ranges are emitted as
accept rules placed above the drop rules in the MikroTik script.
Subnet consolidation
Blocked IPs are grouped by WHOIS subnet (via whois.radb.net). If ≥ 3
malicious IPs share a subnet, the entire subnet is blocked instead of
individual /32 or /128 entries. Results are cached to
reports/whois_cache.json.
Log format reference
copyparty
15:55:47.466 34.105.30.251 37140 LOG: GET //2020/wp-includes/wlwmanifest.xml @*
15:55:47.466 34.105.30.251 37140 LOG: @* has no access to '/2020/wp-includes/wlwmanifest.xml'
15:55:47.466 34.105.30.251 37140 CRIT: client banned: 403s
15:55:47.695 34.105.30.251 37144 BTW: banned for 86399 sec
16:00:34.385 hsrv LOG: ok bye
Nginx Proxy Manager
[02/Aug/2026:05:01:31 +0200] - 401 401 - GET https example.tld "/wp-content/plugins/x.php" [Client 72.146.20.230] [Length 2127] [Gzip -] [Sent-to 192.168.88.12] "-" "-"
[02/Aug/2026:09:01:11 +0200] - 200 200 - GET https example.tld "/" [Client 2a00:6340:2008:ec80::1] [Length 1651] [Gzip 2.97] [Sent-to 192.168.88.12] "Mozilla/5.0 ..." "-"
Fields: [datetime], upstream status, proxy status, method, scheme, host,
"path", [Client IP], [Length N], [Gzip X], [Sent-to IP], "UA",
"Referer".
Extending
- new whitelist provider → add URLs, local file paths, and fallback CIDRs
to
app/whitelists.py - new detection pattern → add a
BadPatterntoapp/bad_patterns.py - new detection rule → add a
flag_*()function toapp/flags.py, return it from the analyzer'sflag()method - new log source → subclass
app.analyzer.Analyzer, implementparse_line()+flag(), declareip_columns/request_columns - new output file → override
write_extra(data_dir)and return the paths written - new I/O format → add writer to
app/files.py - new report section → add rendering logic to
app/reporting.py