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linearvoid/docs/SECURITY.md
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zwitschi 926a663c23 Add comprehensive documentation for Linear Void project
- Created README.md in docs folder outlining project structure and documentation links.
- Added SECURITY.md detailing the security model, threat model, authentication, transport security, network isolation, and incident response procedures.
- Introduced SETUP.md providing a detailed setup guide for local and production environments, including prerequisites, environment setup, and Gitea integration.
- Added STREAMING.md outlining the streaming pipeline, including production flow, source-media contract, playout and HLS packaging, cache contract, player behavior, and monitoring.
- Updated architecture documentation to include links to new SETUP.md and STREAMING.md files for better navigation.
2026-08-08 14:52:19 +02:00

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# Security Guide
Layered security model for Linear Void.
## Threat Model
```
┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐
│ Client │───▶│Cloudflare│───▶│ nginx │───▶│ Backend │
│ (public) │ │ WAF+CDN │ │ proxy │ │ chat │
└──────────┘ └──────────┘ └────┬─────┘ └────┬─────┘
│ │
┌──────┴──────┐ ┌─────┴──────┐
│ /health │ │ /api/admin │
│ /metrics │ │ /ws (chat) │
│ /hls/* │ │ /api/chat/* │
│ (public) │ │ (auth req) │
└─────────────┘ └────────────┘
```
## Authentication & Sessions
- Login: `POST /api/admin/login` → cookie `linearvoid_admin_session`
- Cookie flags: `HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Strict`, `Secure` (over HTTPS)
- Server-side expiry via `ADMIN_SESSION_TTL_HOURS`
- Rate limit: 5 attempts/IP/5min via Redis
## Transport Security (TLS/HSTS)
- Cloudflare TLS mode: **Full (strict)** — valid origin cert required
- nginx listens on 80 internally; Cloudflare handles TLS termination
- HSTS header set by Cloudflare: `max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload`
- WSS upgrade path: `/ws` through nginx → chat:3000
## Network Isolation
- All backend services on internal Docker network (`linearvoid-net`)
- Only nginx port exposed to host (443/80)
- Database, Redis, exporters inaccessible from outside
- `docker-compose.prod.yml` keeps ports internal via `expose:` not `ports:`
## Reverse Proxy Controls
- `auth_request /api/admin/auth` gate on all `/admin` and `/api/admin` paths
- Explicit `client_max_body_size 64m` for resumable upload chunks
- WebSocket upgrade headers: `Upgrade`, `Connection` preserved
- CORS headers on HLS: `Access-Control-Allow-Origin *`
- XSS protection: CSP headers served by Cloudflare
## Rate Limiting
| Resource | Limit | Window |
| ----------------- | ----- | ------ |
| WebSocket connect | 5/IP | 60s |
| Chat messages | 10/IP | 10s |
| Admin login | 5/IP | 5min |
Implemented via Redis `INCR` + `EXPIRE`.
## Secrets Management
- `.env` — local dev only, **gitignored**
- Gitea Actions secrets (`CI_*` prefix) for CI/CD
- Never commit: passwords, tokens, API keys, R2 credentials
- Production `.env` provisioned manually on host, never checked in
- Rotate admin password quarterly
## Data Protection
- PostgreSQL: chat history, moderation logs, media metadata
- Redis: append-only persistence for presence, rate limits, sessions
- HLS segments: ephemeral, regenerated by playout
- Backups: `scripts/backup-db.sh` (daily), `scripts/backup-weekly.sh`, `scripts/verify-backups.sh`
## Hardening Checklist
- [ ] HTTPS/WSS enforced end-to-end (Cloudflare Full strict)
- [ ] Strong admin credentials configured
- [ ] Secrets only in env/secrets stores (never committed)
- [ ] Proxy auth and websocket headers validated
- [ ] Upload limits and MIME validation active
- [ ] Rate limiting active (WS, messages, login)
- [ ] Cloudflare WAF/rate-limit rules active
- [ ] Backup/restore drills completed
- [ ] Security alerts routed (Prometheus alertmanager)
## Incident Response
1. Detect — alerts (ChatDown, RedisDown, HighChatLatency) or user reports
2. Triage — edge (Cloudflare), proxy (nginx), app (chat/playout), data (Redis/Postgres)
3. Contain — rate limit, credential rotate, service restart, slate mode activation
4. Recover — verify health endpoints, check Prometheus targets, validate HLS output
5. Record — timeline + corrective actions in `docs/incident-runbook.md`