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intrusion-detection/README.md
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# All You Can GET Intrusion Detection System
Local-development intrusion detection / log analysis for two log sources:
| Script | Source | Detection rule |
| ----------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `scan.py` | both sources | consolidated scan + unified MikroTik export |
| `copyparty.py` | [copyparty](https://github.com/9001/copyparty) server logs | denied-only IPs + copyparty auto-bans |
| `npm.py` | [Nginx Proxy Manager](https://nginxproxymanager.com) proxy logs | high error-rate IPs (scanners) |
| `utils.py` | re-export layer | thin barrel — imports from sub-modules below |
| `models.py` | data model | `Request`, `IPStats`, `aggregate()` |
| `ip_utils.py` | IP helpers | `parse_ip`, `whitelist_of`, `is_whitelisted`, `sort_ips`, `split_versions` |
| `flags.py` | detection rules | `flag_scanners`, `flag_denied_only`, `flag_malicious_patterns`, `by_total` |
| `analyzer.py` | pipeline | `Analyzer` — discover → load → analyze → report → write |
| `whitelists.py` | whitelist module | provider CIDR constants, local/remote load, CIDR extraction |
| `bad_patterns.py` | pattern detection | malicious URL/file regex classification |
| `whois.py` | WHOIS query | `query_whois_subnet`, `consolidate_by_subnet` |
| `mikrotik.py` | RouterOS export | `mikrotik_script`, `write_mikrotik`, `split_cidr_versions` |
| `files.py` | I/O helpers | `read_lines`, `find_logs`, `write_csv`, `write_json`, etc. |
| `reporting.py` | text rendering | `Column`, `render_table`, `render_kv`, `timestamp_name` |
Both per-source scripts parse logs, aggregate per-IP behaviour, split
IPv4/IPv6, skip whitelisted provider ranges, detect malicious path patterns,
group flagged IPs into WHOIS subnets, and emit a ready-to-import MikroTik
RouterOS firewall script.
`scan.py` runs both analyzers, merges their blocklists, and writes a single
consolidated `.rsc`.
> Status: **local dev**. Runs offline against log files on disk. It does not
> talk to the router, does not run as a service, and blocks nothing by itself.
> You review the generated `.rsc` and import it manually.
## Architecture
```text
intrusion-detection/
├── scan.py consolidated scanner entry point
├── copyparty.py copyparty log adapter (~150 lines)
├── npm.py NPM proxy log adapter (~150 lines)
├── utils.py thin re-export barrel (~90 lines)
├── models.py Request, IPStats, aggregate()
├── ip_utils.py IP parsing, whitelist lookups, sorting
├── flags.py flag_scanners, flag_denied_only, flag_malicious_patterns
├── analyzer.py Analyzer pipeline base class
├── whitelists.py provider CIDR constants, local/remote load
├── bad_patterns.py malicious URL/file regex patterns
├── whois.py query_whois_subnet, consolidate_by_subnet
├── mikrotik.py RouterOS .rsc script generation
├── files.py read_lines, find_logs, write_csv/json/lines
├── reporting.py Column, render_table, render_kv, timestamp_name
├── data/ whitelist source files (cached locally)
│ ├── openfactory/
│ │ └── geofeed.csv
│ ├── cloudflare/
│ │ ├── ips-v4.txt
│ │ └── ips-v6.txt
│ └── paloalto/
│ └── scanner-ips.txt
├── reports/ generated reports (per-run + per-source)
│ ├── copyparty/
│ ├── npm/
│ └── mikrotik-block.rsc consolidated .rsc (scan.py only)
└── README.md
```
`copyparty.py` and `npm.py` are thin adapters. Each supplies a log matcher,
a line parser, a flagging rule, and column definitions. `utils.py` is a barrel
module that re-exports everything from the sub-modules so callers only need
`import utils`.
Core responsibilities by module:
| Module | Owns |
| ----------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `models.py` | `Request`, `IPStats`, `aggregate()` |
| `ip_utils.py` | `parse_ip`, `whitelist_of`, `is_whitelisted`, `sort_ips`, `split_versions` |
| `flags.py` | `flag_scanners`, `flag_denied_only`, `flag_malicious_patterns`, `by_total` |
| `analyzer.py` | `Analyzer` — discover → load → analyze → report → write |
| `whitelists.py` | provider CIDR constants, local-file / remote / built-in loading |
| `bad_patterns.py` | malicious URL/file regex classification |
| `whois.py` | `query_whois_subnet`, `consolidate_by_subnet` |
| `mikrotik.py` | `mikrotik_script`, `write_mikrotik`, `split_cidr_versions` |
| `files.py` | `read_lines`, `find_logs`, `validate_dir`, `ensure_dirs`, `write_csv/json/lines` |
| `reporting.py` | `Column`, `render_table`, `render_kv`, `timestamp_name` |
Console output and saved reports are the **same string** (`Analyzer.text_report()`).
## Requirements
- Python 3.10+
- stdlib only, no dependencies
## Usage
```powershell
# individual scanners
python copyparty.py
python npm.py
# consolidated (both sources, unified blocklist)
python scan.py
```
All scripts accept CLI overrides:
| Flag | Default | Meaning |
| ----------------- | -------------------- | ----------------------------- |
| `--log-path` | see below | log directory |
| `--report-dir` | `reports/<name>` | output directory |
| `--top N` | `30` | rows in the top-IP table |
| `--quiet` | off | write files, print only paths |
| `--no-rsc` | off | skip MikroTik export |
| `--min-errors N` | `5` (`npm.py`) | error count threshold |
| `--error-ratio F` | `0.5` (`npm.py`) | error ratio threshold |
| `--min-denied N` | `1` (`copyparty.py`) | denied-hit threshold |
`scan.py` accepts all flags from both scanners plus `--copyparty-log-path`,
`--copyparty-report-dir`, `--npm-log-path`, `--npm-report-dir`, and
`--report-dir` for the consolidated output.
Default log paths (overridable by `.env`):
| Script | Env var | Default |
| -------------- | -------------------- | -------------- |
| `copyparty.py` | `COPYPARTY_LOG_PATH` | `P:\copyparty` |
| `npm.py` | `NPM_LOG_PATH` | `Y:\npm\logs` |
Examples:
```powershell
python npm.py --log-path D:\logs\npm --min-errors 10 --error-ratio 0.8
python copyparty.py --top 100 --no-rsc
python scan.py --quiet --no-rsc
```
## Output
Each script writes to its own report directory. `scan.py` also writes a
consolidated `.rsc`:
```text
reports/
├── copyparty/
│ ├── data/
│ │ ├── ips_ipv4.csv per-IP: total, denied, banned, users
│ │ ├── ips_ipv6.csv
│ │ ├── ips.json full per-IP detail w/ malicious hits
│ │ ├── denied_paths.csv denied paths, hit counts
│ │ ├── denied_ips.txt flagged IPv4 + metadata
│ │ ├── denied_ipv6.txt
│ │ ├── banned_ips.txt copyparty auto-banned IPv4
│ │ ├── banned_ipv6.txt
│ │ ├── blocked_ipv4.txt final block set (non-whitelisted)
│ │ ├── blocked_ipv6.txt
│ │ ├── authed_users.json authenticated user counts
│ │ ├── requests.csv every parsed request
│ │ └── mikrotik-block.rsc
│ └── 2026-08-02-12-00-00.txt timestamped report
├── npm/
│ ├── data/
│ │ ├── ips_ipv4.csv per-IP: total, 4xx, 5xx, ratio, methods
│ │ ├── ips_ipv6.csv
│ │ ├── ips.json
│ │ ├── error_paths.csv
│ │ ├── scanner_ips.txt flagged IPv4 + metadata
│ │ ├── scanner_ipv6.txt
│ │ ├── blocked_ipv4.txt
│ │ ├── blocked_ipv6.txt
│ │ ├── ua_summary.csv user agent breakdown
│ │ ├── host_summary.csv virtual host breakdown
│ │ ├── requests.csv
│ │ └── mikrotik-block.rsc
│ └── 2026-08-02-12-00-00.txt
└── mikrotik-block.rsc consolidated (scan.py only)
```
## Detection
### Three detection layers
Blocklist candidates come from three independent sources, merged at scan time:
1. **Error-rate flagging** (`npm.py`) — IPs with many 4xx/5xx responses and a
high error ratio:
$$\text{errors} \geq 5 \qquad \text{and} \qquad \frac{\text{errors}}{\text{total}} \geq 0.5$$
2. **Denied-only flagging** (`copyparty.py`) — IPs that hit denied paths and
never authenticated:
$$\text{block} = \text{denied-only} \cup \text{banned} \setminus \text{whitelist}$$
3. **Malicious-pattern flagging** (both analyzers) — IPs whose request paths
match known probe/attack signatures (`.env`, `.git/config`, WordPress
probes, webshell filenames, etc.) at severity ≥ 2.
### Pattern categories (`bad_patterns.py`)
| Pattern | Severity | Matches |
| ------------------- | ------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `env_file` | 3 (critical) | `.env`, `.env.production`, `.aws/credentials`, `config.json` |
| `vcs_probe` | 3 (critical) | `.git/config`, `.svn/` |
| `sensitive_file` | 3 (critical) | `id_rsa`, `id_dsa`, `.pem`, `.key`, `.ppk` |
| `webshell_probe` | 3 (critical) | Known webshell filenames (xstelth, adminfuns, wp_filemanager, etc.) |
| `wp_probe` | 2 (high) | `wp-admin`, `wp-login`, `wp-content`, `wp-includes` |
| `generic_php_probe` | 1 (moderate) | Single/double-char/numeric `.php` files |
| `well_known_probe` | 1 (moderate) | `.well-known/` paths |
Flagging metadata fields:
- `errors` / `denied` — hostile hit count
- `total` — all requests from that IP
- `ratio` — error ratio (npm only)
- `first` / `last` — first and last timestamp seen
- `malicious_hits` — count of malicious-pattern request paths
## Whitelisted ranges
Whitelists live in `whitelists.py` and `data/`. Loading priority per provider:
1. **Local files** in `data/<provider>/` (offline-safe, committed to repo)
2. **Remote download** (fetches latest, saves to local file on success)
3. **Built-in fallback** (hardcoded constants, always available)
Each layer overrides the previous. Known-good ranges are emitted as
`accept` rules placed **above** the `drop` rules in the MikroTik script.
### Subnet consolidation
Blocked IPs are grouped by WHOIS subnet (via `whois.radb.net`). If ≥ 3
malicious IPs share a subnet, the entire subnet is blocked instead of
individual `/32` or `/128` entries. Results are cached to
`reports/whois_cache.json`.
## Log format reference
### copyparty
```log
15:55:47.466 34.105.30.251 37140 LOG: GET //2020/wp-includes/wlwmanifest.xml @*
15:55:47.466 34.105.30.251 37140 LOG: @* has no access to '/2020/wp-includes/wlwmanifest.xml'
15:55:47.466 34.105.30.251 37140 CRIT: client banned: 403s
15:55:47.695 34.105.30.251 37144 BTW: banned for 86399 sec
16:00:34.385 hsrv LOG: ok bye
```
### Nginx Proxy Manager
```log
[02/Aug/2026:05:01:31 +0200] - 401 401 - GET https example.tld "/wp-content/plugins/x.php" [Client 72.146.20.230] [Length 2127] [Gzip -] [Sent-to 192.168.88.12] "-" "-"
[02/Aug/2026:09:01:11 +0200] - 200 200 - GET https example.tld "/" [Client 2a00:6340:2008:ec80::1] [Length 1651] [Gzip 2.97] [Sent-to 192.168.88.12] "Mozilla/5.0 ..." "-"
```
Fields: `[datetime]`, upstream status, proxy status, method, scheme, host,
`"path"`, `[Client IP]`, `[Length N]`, `[Gzip X]`, `[Sent-to IP]`, `"UA"`,
`"Referer"`.
## Extending
- **new whitelist provider** → add URLs, local file paths, and fallback CIDRs
to `whitelists.py`
- **new detection pattern** → add a `BadPattern` to `bad_patterns.py`
- **new detection rule** → add a `flag_*()` function to `flags.py`, return it
from the analyzer's `flag()` method
- **new log source** → subclass `analyzer.Analyzer`, implement `parse_line()` +
`flag()`, declare `ip_columns` / `request_columns`
- **new output file** → override `write_extra(data_dir)` and return the paths
written
- **new I/O format** → add writer to `files.py`
- **new report section** → add rendering logic to `reporting.py`